Being, Non-Being and Becoming Non-Identical of the Subject as ∅


If the one is not, nothing is. ~ Parmenides

In a recent article citing my Postnihilistic Speculations on That Which Is Not: A Thought-World According to an Ontology of Non-Being, the giant of philosophical blogosphere and my fellow para-academic colleague S.C. Hickman has succintly outlined the roots of contemporary ontology. Drawing upon Parmenides, Plato, Meillassoux, Žižek and Badiou in praticular, he has provided new insight concerning the relationship between being, non-being and becoming. After quoting my take on the retroactively speculative new direction in philosophy he goes on to say this:

“As I was reading this post of his I felt a deep underlying, almost religious tone in his voice; the power of the absolute filtering its banal surprise (maybe a non-God, non-All, rather than the mundane gods or God religion or the philosophers). Whatever the absolute may be, it seems to ride the edges, or borderlands of between thought and non-being rather than the metaphysical realms of Being. Though secular through and through the incorporation of the themes of eternity, time, mortality, immortality, etc. like those others who have influenced our thinking: Nietzsche, Badiou, Zizek, Laruelle, Henry, Deleuze, etc. – and, lest we forget, Freud (Lacan: lack?) with his mythology of drives, that endless war of eros and thanatos, life and death, love and war – comes through Erdem’s essay. What struck me above all is the underlying mythos and movement toward transcension, toward elsewhere, immortality, transcendence. Of course as he says, this is nothing new, and it is everywhere in our present transcendental field of speculation, as if between a totalistic closure upon metaphysics had brought with it – not a rational kernel, but rather an irrational kernel of ancient thought. For do we not hear that oldest of songsters, Orpheus, the Greek singer, theologian, poet, philosophical forbear out of whose roots Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle and their ancient antagonists Leucippas, Democritus, and Lucretius down to our day still wage a war over the body of a dead thought (God?).”~ S.C. Hickman, Social Ecologies

When it comes to philosophy I usually avoid dialogue, in that sense I am strictly Deleuzean, a man of “free indirect speech”, always sustaining a kind of internal dialogue with the philosopher’s image of thought he created in his mind. Rather than engaging in polemics with the philosophers, Deleuze used to think with them, although not always in accordance with them, sometimes for and sometimes against them, always disjunctively synthesizing affirmation and negation as well as transcendence and immanence. For Deleuze the important thing was to bring out that which matters in thought. So, what I intend to do in this brief note will be an active reading of Craig’s article rather than a reaction to it. I shall therefore point out that which is missing in his account, namely the relationship between time and change.

Now, for Kant the thing-in-itself, or the noumenon, could be thought but couldn’t be known. We could only know the transcendental ground of our thought, and therefore the thing-in-itself is not submitted to change. For change requires the transcendental constitution of the subject to take place in time. The subject constitutes and is constituted by the transformation of the thing-in-itself(noumenon) into the thing-for-us (phenomenon).

In his Critique of JudgementKant distinguishes between the determinative and the reflective modes of judgement.

If the universal (the rule, the principle, the law) is given, the judgement that subsumes the particular under it is determinative. If, however, only the particular for which the universal is to be found is given, judgement is merely reflective. [1]

If we keep in mind that the reflective mode of judgement reflects on particulars in such a way as to produce universals to which they can be subjected, and that the determinative mode of judgement determines a particular by subjecting it to a universal, it becomes understandable why among these two it is the reflective mode which splits as it unites the subject of enunciation and the enunciated subject. But it must also be kept in mind that the subject of enunciation which refers to the universal is itself a constitutive illusion, or a regulatory idea necessary for the emergence of the subject as the enunciated content. It is only in and through a position of non-being within and without being at the same time that the becoming non-identical of the subject can take place. For change requires the localisation of being in a particular world submitted to time as Badiou puts it in his Being and Event. Therein Badiou asserts that there can be multiplicities not submitted to change and there can also be ones submitted to change. Change is not on the side of multiplicity but on the side of the relationship between multiplicities. There can only be a relation between multiplicities in a particular world. Change is the property of being when being is localised in a world. Change is not the destiny of being as in Heraclitus, but is submitted to the relation between multiples. Hence Badiou can say that “the one does not exist.” It exists neither as a totality as in Parmenides, nor as a multiplicity as in Heraclitus. While for Heraclitus being is in constant change, for Parmenides being is that which never changes. Kant splits being into two halves, one half of being ever changes(phenomenon), while the other half of being never changes(noumenon). For Heraclitus there is only multiplicity, while for Parmenides there is only one. If we have mutltiplicity then there is also change, if we have the one there is no change at all. Being an atomist, Democritus says that being is composed of atoms and the universe is composed of an infinity of atoms. Democritus is the atomic explosion of Parmenides and the sub-atomic implosion of Heraclitus at the same time.[2]

We find ourselves on the brink of the decision, a decision to break with the arcana of the one and the multiple in which philosophy is born and buried, phoenix of its own sophistical consumption. This decision can take no other form than the following: the one is not.[3]

Is there an existing totality before thought? If there is one, is there a part of this existing totality which is outside change? We exist in a world of change and when we think the world we think its change. For change to be thought there has to be an identity first. The relationship between identity and difference is probably the oldest and most complicated philosophical problem. The two orientations of thought concerning the problem of change and the interaction between identity and difference have their roots in Socrates and Zeno as analysed by Badiou in Being and Event.

If one allows that being is being-in-situation—which means unfolding its limit for the Greeks—it is quite true that in suppressing the ‘there is’ of the one, one suppresses everything, since ‘everything’ is necessarily ‘many’. The sole result of this suppression is nothingness. But if one is concerned with being-qua-being, the multiple-without-one, it is true that the non-being of the one is that particular truth whose entire effect resides in establishing the dream of a multiple disseminated without limits. It is this ‘dream’ which was given the fixity of thought in Cantor’s creation. Plato’s aporetic conclusion can be interpreted as an impasse of being, situated at the deciding point of the couple of the inconsistent multiple and the consistent multiple. ‘If the one is not, (the) nothing is’ also means that it is only in completely thinking through the non-being of the one that the name of the void emerges as the unique conceivable presentation of what supports, as unpresentable and as pure multiplicity, any plural presentation, that is, any one-effect. Plato’s text sets four concepts to work on the basis of the apparent couple of the one and the others: the one-being, the there-is of the one, the pure multiple and the structured multiple. If the knot of these concepts remains undone in the final aporia, and if the void triumphs therein, it is solely because the gap between the supposition of the one’s being and the operation of its ‘there is’ remains unthought. This gap, however, is named by Plato many times in his work. It is precisely what provides the key to the Platonic concept par excellence, participation, and it is not for nothing that at the very beginning of the Parmenides, before the entrance of the old master, Socrates has recourse to this concept in order to destroy Zeno’s arguments on the one and the multiple.[4]

Badiou proclaims “the multiple as heterogeneous dissemination,”[5] while Žižek rightly criticizes Meillassoux in particular and Speculative Realism in general for not having an adequate theory of the subject for the present, for the time of being in change.

I think that, in its very anti-transcendentalism, Meillassoux remains caught in the Kantian topic of the accessibility of the thing-in-itself: is what we experience as reality fully determined by our subjective-transcendental horizon, or can we get to know something about the way reality is independently of our subjectivity. Meillassoux’s claim is to achieve the breakthrough into independent ‘objective’ reality. For me as a Hegelian, there is a third option: the true problem that arises after we perform the basic speculative gesture of Meillassoux (transposing the contingency of our notion of reality into the thing itself) is not so much what more can we say about reality-in-itself, but how does our subjective standpoint, and subjectivity itself, fit into reality. The problem is not ‘can we penetrate through the veil of subjectively-constituted phenomena to things-inthemselves’, but ‘how do phenomena themselves arise within the flat stupidity of reality which just is, how does reality redouble itself and start to appear to itself ’. For this, we need a theory of subject which is neither that of transcendental subjectivity nor that of reducing the subject to a part of objective reality. This theory is, as far as I can see, still lacking in speculative realism.[6]

Today philosophy has a tendency to think outside the contemporary world, whereas the goal of Ancient Greek philosophy had been to find an orientation of thought for the good life in time. The quest was how to live in accordance with a conception of goodness in mind. This is not an abstract goal, but rather aims at transforming subjectivity as it is here and now.

If one took the point of being which seemed to be the smallest, much like a dream within sleep, it would immediately appear multiple instead of its semblance of one, and instead of its extreme smallness, it would appear enormous, compared to the dissemination that it is starting from itself.[7]

In his Logics of Worlds, Badiou makes a distinction between being and existence.

I have posed that existence is nothing other than the degree of self-identity of a multiple-being, such as it is established by a transcendental indexing. With regard to the multiple-being as thought in its being, it follows that its existence is contingent, since it depends—as a measurable intensity—on the world where the being, which is said to exist, appears. This contingency of existence is crucial for Kant, because it intervenes as a determination of the transcendental operation itself. This operation is effectively defined as ‘the application of the pure concepts of the understanding to possible experience’. In my vocabulary—and obviously with no reference to any ‘application’—this can be put as follows: the logical constitution of pure appearing, the indexing of a pure multiple on a worldly transcendental. But, just as with the object, Kant will immediately distinguish within this operation its properly transcendental or a priori facet from its receptive or empirical one.[8]

As the subject’s intensity of self-consciousness increases, so does its pain and anxiety in the face of death. This causes hopelessness and despair which may or may not lead to a total devastation of the project of inverting and putting into the spotlight the nothingness at the centre of the subject. Heidegger repeatedly puts all this down in Being and Time when he says that “being-towards-death is angst.” One cure for expelling anxiety has been to believe in god, any other metaphysical construct, or in some cases it has even taken the form of a materialist system of thought; in all these cases, however, an escape is seen as a solution when in fact it is the problem itself. For our concerns, an escapist attitude, and especially one that tries to go beyond the present, does not work at all, for what we are looking for is a way of learning to make use of the reality of the death drive as an interior exteriority constitutive of the subject as a creative agent of change at present, in the time of the living and the dead at once.

And finally here is the Lacanian definition of the subject referred to by Badiou towards the very end of Being and Event

I am not, there where I am the plaything of my thought; I think of what I am, there where I do not think I am thinking.[9]


Reference Matter

[1] Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. James Creed Meredith (London: Wilder Publications, 2008), 13

[2] Alain Badiou, Being and Event, Meditation Two: Plato, trans. Oliver Feltham (New York: Continuum, 2005), 31-7

[3] Badiou, BE, 23

[4] Badiou, BE, 36

[5] Badiou, BE, 33

[6] Slavoj Žižek, Interview with Ben Woodard, in The Speculative Turn: Continental Realism and Materialism, Graham Harman, Nick Srnicek, Levi Bryant (eds.), (Melbourne:, 2011), 415

[7] Badiou, BE, 34

[8] Alain Badiou, Logics of Worlds, Section Two, Kant, trans. Alberto Toscano (London: Continuum, 2009), 237

[9] Badiou, BE, 431

A letter from Badiou to Deleuze on Heidegger (July 1994)


I would like to resume, today, the parallel between you and Heidegger that I was sketching in my last letter.

1) A crucial difference seems to count against the comparison. In your work there is no “historial” set up, of the type “history of the forgetting of being”, “decline”, etc. As you say, you are certainly not tormented by the “end” of philosophy. You pick up the energy of your epoch, as must be done for each epoch. You love and think the cinema, the American novel, singular popular movements, Bacon’s paintings…The peasant from the Black Forest does not impress you. You are a man  of the imperial metropolis, a man of the bestial power of capitalism, a man of invisible subtractions, also, and of the finest of contemporary capillarities.

2) Being for you is not at at all a “question”, and moreover you do not in any way consecrate philosophy to “questioning”, any more than to “debates”, that French parliamentary form of German “questioning”.

3) Your personal philosophical genealogy (the Stoics, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hume, a certain Kant, Nietzsche, Bergson…) is very different from Heidegger’s (the Pre-Socratics, Aristotle, a different Leibniz, Schelling, a different Nietzsche, Husserl…).

4) Nevertheless three points strike me as the distant indication of a resonance.

The hostility to Plato. And, in a certain sense, for the same reason as for Heidegger: Plato is the establishment of a régime of Transcendence.

The hostility to Descartes. There too, a common motif, in almost opposite languages, can be devined: Descartes is the establishment of a régime of mastery subordinated to the Subjet.

The conviction that Nietzsche is an essential “turning point”. You argue very finely against Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche. But at stake, for you as much as for him, is a decisive question: how to give meaning to affirmation? And this donation of meaning to affirmation (this “meaning of active force”) is tied to the critique of Plato. Because Plato extenuates active (or immanent) force in the (transcendent) separation of the Idea.

5) What distances you from Plato is the conviction that the access to the real must be thought as immanent (or creative) trial, and not as inscription, or matheme. What distances you from Descartes is the conviction that this immanent trial does not have its criterion in the clarified chain of reasons, but in a descriptive finesse, of which Art is the veritable paradigm. What ties you to Nietzsche is the conviction that the Multiple must be thought as duplicity of Life (active and reactive forces), and not as inertia, or simple extension.

6) The decisive point seems to me to be your conception of Being as pure virtuality. This is not at all Heidegger’s vocabulary. Nevertheless, his “latence” and your Chaos are co-thinkable. They are co-thinkable as ultimate reserve, of which there exists no direct experience, and of which the thought is simultaneously exposing and sheltering.

There is in Heidegger a pathetic version of the trial of thought: the “height of distress”, etc. You avoid this sort of jargon. But you too come to think of thought as the “traversal”, that is at once demanding, proximate, and sheltered, of the infinite virtual. That Being is pure virtuality entails that thoughtful creation is always like a fragmentary witnessing in view of a voyage on the edge of chaos.

This is why the figure of Christ can serve you as a metaphor, as much for Spinoza as for Bartleby the scrivener. Just as it is constantly sub-jacent to the way in which Heidegger describes the “nostos”, or the endurance of Hölderlin. It’s that your general logic of fluxes is like a version without pathos of what Heidegger describes as the liberty of the Open.

Finally, the decision to think Being, not as simple unfolding, neutral, entirely actual, with no depth, but as virtuality constantly traversed by actualisations; the fact that these actualisations are like the populating of a cut (cut of the plane of immanence for you, cut of beings for Heidegger); all that entails a logic of reserved power, that I think is common, in this century, to Heidegger and to you.

My question would thus be the following: what in your view essentially distinguishes your relation virtual/ actualisations from Heidegger’s relation of Being and beings?

We are here (as when you seek to situate me as a Neo-Kantian) in a protocol of investigation of your own creation of concepts, and not in what is your most intimate enemy: Analogy.


A letter from Alain Badiou to Gilles Deleuze, first published in Libération, 07-11-95. Translation by Terence Blake.

via Agent Swarm

Gilles Deleuze’s Opus Corpus and Beyond (1925 – 1995)

GILLES DELEUZE (1925 - 1995)



  • Deleuze, Philosophy, Transdisciplinarity, Centre for Cultural Studies, Goldsmiths College, University of London, February 10-11, 2012


  • Deleuze and Visual Art, Faculty of Philosophy, Erasmus University Rotterdam, and Nederlands Genootschap voor Esthetica, October 14, 2010


  • Deleuze in Context, Department of Philosophy, University of Dundee, September 24, 2010
  • Deleuze and Nomadic Methodologies, Amsterdam School of Cultural Analysis, University of Amsterdam and Centre for the Humanities, Utrecht University, July 12-14, 2010
  • Deleuze: Ethics and Politics, 4th Biennial Philosophy and Literature Conference, Purdue University, April 9-10, 2010
  • Deleuze and Activism, Centre for Critical and Cultural Theory, Cardiff University, November 11-13, 2009
  • Connect Deleuze: Transdisciplinary Perspectives, Second International Deleuze Studies Conference, Department for American Studies, University of Cologne, August 10-12, 2009
  • On ‘Foucault’: a Workshop on Gilles Deleuze’s Book Foucault, Volcanic Lines: Deleuzian Research Group, University of Greenwich, April 18
  • Deleuze and the Political, Scottish Centre for Contemporary French Philosophy, University of Dundee, November 1, 2008

  • One or Several Deleuzes?, First International Deleuze Studies Conference, Cardiff University, August 11-13, 2008

  • The Deleuzian Event, English Research Institute, Manchester Metropolitan University, September 8-9, 2007

  • The Strange Encounter of Kant and Deleuze, Department of Philosophy, Greenwich University, July 7, 2007

  • Integrations #1: an Introductory Workshop on Deleuze and the Differential Calculus, Department of Philosophy, Greenwich University, April 14, 2007

  • Deleuze: Texts and Images, 9th Annual Conference, Department of Comparative Literature, University of South Carolina, April 5-8, 2007

  • Deleuze and Rationalism, Centre for Research in Modern European Philosophy, Middlesex University, March 15-16, 2007

  • The Work of Gilles Deleuze, Department of Philosophy, University of Greenwich, July 1, 2006

  • Deleuze and Literature, Centre for Research in Philosophy and Literature, Department of Philosophy, University of Warwick, March 20-21, 2006

  • The Living Thought of Gilles Deleuze, University of Copenhagen, Denmark, November 3-4, 2005

  • Deleuze and the Fold, Research Group in Post-Kantian European Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, University of Warwick, June 27, 2005

  • Philosophy and Aesthetics: Lyotard and Deleuze, University of Melbourne, Australia, June 22-24, 2005

  • Virtual Mathematics: the Logic of Difference, Centre for the History of European Discourses, University of Queensland, June 20, 2005

  • Gilles Deleuze: Experimenting with Intensities: Science, Philosophy, Politics, the Arts, Department of Philosophy, Trent University, May 12- 15, 2004





  • Anthologies:
    • Pure Immanence: Essays on a Life.  New York: Zone, 2005.

    • Deux régimes de fous et autres textes.  Ed. David Lapoujade.  Paris: Minuit, 2003.

      • Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews, 1975-1995New York: Semiotext(e), 2006.

    • L’île déserte et autres textes.  Ed. David Lapoujade.  Paris: Minuit, 2002.

      • Desert Islands and Other Texts, 1953-1974.  Trans. Mike Taormina.  New York: Semiotext(e), 2003.

    • Critique et clinique.  Paris: Minuit, 1993.
      • Essays Critical and Clinical  Trans. Daniel Smith and Michael Greco.  Minneapolis: U  of Minnesota P, 1997.
    • The Deleuze ReaderEd. Constantin Boundas.  New York: Columbia UP, 1993.

    • On the Line.  By Deleuze and Félix Guattari.  New York: Semiotext(e), 1983.
  • Selected Individual Works:
    • Psychanalyse et transversalité: Essai d’analyse institutionnelle.  By Deleuze and Félix Guattari.  Paris: La Découverte, 2003.
      • Nomadology: the War Machine.  By Deleuze and Félix Guattari.  New York: Semiotext(e), 1996.
    • Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?.  By Deleuze and Félix Guattari.   Paris: Minuit, 1991.
      • What is Philosophy?.  Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell.  New York: Columbia UP, 1994.
    • Le Pli: Leibniz et le Baroque.  Paris: Minuit, 1988.
      • The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque.  Trans. Tom Conley.  Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1993.
    • Foucault.  Paris: Minuit, 1986.
      • Foucault.  Trans. Sean Hand.  Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1988.
    • Cinéma II: l’Image-temps.  Paris: Minuit, 1985.
      • Cinema II: the Time-Image.  Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam.  Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1989.
    • Cinéma I: l’Image-Mouvement.  Paris: Minuit, 1983.
      • Cinema I: The Movement-Image.  Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam.  Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1986.
    • Francis Bacon: Logique de la sensation.  2 Vols.  Paris: La différence, 1981.
      • Francis Bacon: the Logic of Sensation.  Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2004.
    • Kafka: pour une littérature mineure.  By Deleuze and Félix Guattari.  Paris: Minuit, 1975.
      • Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature.  Trans. Dana Polan.  Minnesota: U of Minnesota P, 1986.
    • Capitalisme et schizophrénie.  By Deleuze and Félix Guattari.   Paris: Minuit.
      • Mille plateaux.  Vol. 2.  1980.
        • A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia.  Trans. Brian Massumi.  Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1987.
      • L’Anti-Oedipe.  Vol. 1.  1972.
        • Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia.  Trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane.  New York: Viking, 1977.  Rpt. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1983.
          • Critical Theory Since 1965Ed. Hazard Adams and Leroy Searle.  Tallahassee: UP of Florida, 1986.  285-308.
    • Spinoza.  Paris: PUF, 1970.  Rev. in 1981 as Spinoza: Philosophie pratique.
      • Spinoza: Practical PhilosophyTrans. Robert Hurley.  San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1988.
    • Logique du sens.  Paris: Minuit, 1969.
      • The Logic of Sense.  Trans. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale.  New York: Columbia UP, 1990.
    • Différence et répétition.  Paris: PUF, 1968.
      • Difference and Repetition.  Trans. Paul Patton.  New York: Columbia UP, 1994.
    • Spinoza et le problème de l’expression.  Paris: Minuit, 1968.
      • Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza.  Trans. Martin Joughin.  New York: Zone Books, 1990.
    • Présentation de Sacher-Masoch.  Paris: Minuit, 1967.
      • Masochism: an Interpretation of Coldness and Cruelty.  Trans. Jean McNeil.  New York: G. Braziller, 1971.
    • Le Bergsonisme.  Paris: PUF, 1966.
      • Bergsonism.  Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam.  New York: Zone Books, 1988.
    • Marcel Proust et les signes.  Paris: PUF, 1964.
      • Proust and Signs.  Trans. Richard Howard.  New York: G. Braziller, 1972.
    • La Philosophie critique de Kant: Doctrine des facultés.  Paris: PUF, 1963.
      • The Critical Philosophy of Kant: the Doctrine of the Faculties.  Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam.  Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1984.
    • Nietzsche et la philosophie.  Paris: PUF, 1962.
      • Nietzsche and Philosophy.  Trans. Hugh Tomlinson.  London: Athlone, 1983.
    • Empirisme et subjectivité: Essai sur la nature humaine selon Hume.  Paris: PUF, 1953.
      • Empiricism and Subjectivity: an Essay on Hume’s Theory of Human Nature.  Trans. Constantin Boundas.  New York: Columbia UP, 1991.
  • Selected Interviews:
    • Pourparlers.  Paris: Minuit, 1990.
      • Negotiations, 1972-1990.  Trans. Martin Joughin.  New York: Columbia UP, 1995.
    • Dialogues.  (avec Claire Parnet).  Paris: Flammarion, 1977.
      • Dialogues.  Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam.  New York: Columbia UP, 1987.  Rpt. 2002.




  • Anthologies:
    • Ansell-Pearson, Keith, ed.  Deleuze and Philosophy: the Difference Engineer.  London: Routledge, 1997.
    • Boundas, Constantin V., and Dorothea Olkowski, eds.  Gilles Deleuze and the Theater of PhilosophyLondon: Routledge, 1994.
    • Buchanan, Ian, and Adrian Parr, eds.  Deleuze and the Contemporary World: Deleuze Connections.  Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2006.

    • Buchanan, Ian, and Gregg Lambert, eds.  Deleuze and Space.  Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2005.

    • Buchanan, Ian, and John Marks, eds.  Deleuze and Literature.  Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2001.

    • Buchanan, Ian, and Claire Colebrook, eds.  Deleuze and Feminist Theory.  Edinburgh: U of Edinburgh P, 2000.

    • Buchanan, Ian, ed.  A Deleuzian Century?  Durham: Duke UP, 1999.

    • Cull, Lawrence, ed.  Deleuze and Performance.  Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2009.

    • Diagrams of Sensation: Deleuze and AestheticsPli 16 (2005).

    • Flaxman, G., ed.  The Brain is the Screen: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Cinema.  Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2000.

    • Fuglsang, Martin, and Bent Meier Sørensen, eds.  Deleuze and the SocialEdinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2006.
    • Herzogenrath, Bernd, ed.  Deleuze/Guattari and Ecology.  London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.

    • Holland, Eugene W., Daniel W. Smith, and Charles J. Stivale, eds.  Gilles Deleuze: Image and Text.  London: Continuum, 2009.
    • Patton, Paul, and John Protevi, eds.  Between Deleuze and Derrida.  London: Continuum, 2003.
    • Patton, Paul, ed.  Deleuze: a Critical Reader.  Oxford: Blackwell, 1996.
    • Parr, Adrian, ed.  The Deleuze Dictionary.  Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2005.
    • Protevi, John, and Mark Bonta, eds.  Deleuze and GeophilosophyEdinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2004.
    • Schwab, Gabriele, ed.  Derrida, Deleuze, Psychoanalysis.  New York: Columbia UP, 2007.
    • Willatt, Edward, and Matt Lee, eds.  Thinking Between Deleuze and Kant: a Strange Encounter.  London: Continuum, 2009.
    • Williams, James, and Bill Ross, eds.  The Transversal Thought of Gilles Deleuze: Encounters and Influences.  Clinamen, 2005.
  • Selected Individual Works:
    • Alliez, Eric.  Deleuze: philosophie virtuelle.  Paris: Synthélabo, 1996.
    • Ansell-Pearson, Keith.  Germinal Life: the Difference and Repetition of Deleuze.  London: Routledge, 1999.
    • Badiou, Alain.  Deleuze: la Clameur de l’Etre.  Paris: Hachette, 1997.
      • Deleuze: the Clamour of Being.  Trans. Louise Burchill.  Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1999.

    • Baugh, Bruce.  “Beyond Hegel?  Deleuze, Foucault, and the New Empiricism”  French Hegel: From Surrealism to Postmodernism.  London: Routledge, 2003.  147-174.
    • Bogue, Ronald.  Deleuze on Cinema.  London: Routledge, 2003.
    • Bogue, Ronald.  Deleuze on Literature.  London: Routledge, 2003.
    • Bogue, Ronald.  Deleuze on Music, Painting and the Arts.  London: Routledge, 2003.
    • Bonta, Mark, and John Protevi.  Deleuze and Geophilosophy: a Guide and Glossary.  New York: Columbia UP, 2004.
    • Boundas, Constantin V.  Deleuze and Philosophy.  Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2006.
    • Brusseau, James.  Isolated Experiences: Gilles Deleuze and the Solitudes of Reversed Platonism.  Albany: SUNY Press, 1998.
    • Colebrook, Claire.  Deleuze: a Guide for the Perplexed.  London: Continuum, 2006.

    • Colebrook, Claire.  Understanding Deleuze.  London: Allen and Unwin, 2003.

    • Colebrook, Claire.  Gilles Deleuze.  London: Routledge, 2001.

    • Descombes, Vincent.  “Difference (Derrida, Deleuze).”  Modern French Philosophy.  Trans. L. Scott-Fox and J. M. Harding.  Cambridge: CUP, 1980.  136-167.

    • Descombes, Vincent.  “The End of Time (Deleuze, Klossowski, Lyotard).”  Modern French Philosophy.  Trans. L. Scott-Fox and J. M. Harding.  Cambridge: CUP, 1980.  168-190.

    • Foucault, Michel.  “Theatrum Philosophicum.”  Critique 282 (1970): 885-908.

      • “Theatrum Philosophicum.”  Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews.  Ed. Donald F. Bouchard.  Trans. and ed. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon.  Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1977.  165-196.
    • Goodchild, Philip.  Gilles Deleuze and the Question of Philosophy1996.

    • Gutting, Gary.  “Deleuze.”  French Philosophy in the Twentieth Century.  Cambridge: CUP, 2001.  331-341.

    • Hallward, Peter.  Out of this World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation.  London: Verso, 2006. [review]

    • Hansen, Mark.  “Becoming as Creative Involution?  Contextualizing Deleuze and Guattari’s Biophilosophy.”  Postmodern Culture 11.1 (): .

    • Hardt, Michael.  Gilles Deleuze: an Apprenticeship in PhilosophyMinneapolis: U Minnesota Press, 1993.

    • Howie, Gillian.  Deleuze and Spinoza: an Aura of Expressionism.  London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.

    • Hughes, Joe.  Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition: a Reader’s Guide.  London: Continuum, 2009.

    • Hughes, Joe.  Deleuze and the Genesis of Representation.  London: Continuum, 2008.

    • Kennedy, Barbara M.  Deleuze and Cinema: the Aesthetics of Sensation.  Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2000.

    • Kerslake, Christian.  Deleuze and the Unconscious.  London: Continuum, 2006.

    • Khalfa, Jean.  Introduction to the Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze.  London: Continuum, 2003.

    • Lambert, Gregg.  The Non-Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze.   London: Continuum, 2002.

    • Lambert, Gregg.  “The Deleuzian Critique of Pure Fiction.”  Sub-Stance 84 (1997): .

    • Lecercle, Jean-Jacques.  Philosophy through the Looking GlassHutchinson, 1985.

    • Marks, John.  Gilles Deleuze: Vitalism and Multiplicity.  London: Pluto, 1998.

    • Martin, Jean-Clet.  Variations: la philosophie de Gilles Deleuze.  Paris: Pyot, 1993.

    • Martin-Jones, David.  Deleuze and World Cinemas.  London: Continuum, 2011.

    • Martin-Jones, David.  Why Deleuze?  Deleuze and Visual Culture.  I. B. Taurus, 2007.

    • Martin-Jones, David.  Deleuze, Cinema and National Identity.  Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2006.

    • Massumi, Brian.  “Deleuze.”  A Companion to Continental PhilosophyEd. Simon Critchley and William R. SchroederOxford: Blackwell, 1998.  559-573.

    • May, Todd.  Gilles Deleuze: an Introduction.  Cambridge: CUP, 2005.
    • Mengue, Phillipe.  Gilles Deleuze ou le système du multiple.  Paris: Kimé, 1994.
    • Olkowski, Dorothy.  Gilles Deleuze and the Ruin of Representation.  Berkeley: U of California P, 1999.
    • Patton, Paul.  Deleuze and the Political.  London: Routledge, 2001.
    • Pisters, Patricia.  The Matrix of Visual Culture: Working with Deleuze in Film Theory.  Stanford: Stanford UP, 2003.
    • Powell, Anna.  Deleuze and the Horror Film.  Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2005.
    • Protevi, John.  Political Physics: Deleuze, Derrida and the Body Politic.  London: Continuum / Athlone, 2001.
    • Rajchman, John.  The Deleuze Connections.  Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000.
    • Rich, Jennifer.  “Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995).”  Twentieth-Century European Cultural Theorists.  2nd Series.  Vol. 296 of Dictionary of Literary Biography.  Ed. Paul Hansom.  Detroit: Gale, 2004.  82-90.

    • Rodowick, David.  Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine.  Durham: Duke UP, 1997.

    • Sedgwick, Peter.  The Philosophy of Deleuze.  Montreal: McGill-Queen’s UP, 2005.

    • Schrift, Alan D.  “Deleuze: Putting Nietzsche to Work: Genealogy, Will to Power, and Other Desiring Machines.”  Nietzsche’s French Legacy: a Genealogy of PoststructuralismLondon: Routledge, 1995.  60-81.

    • Welchman, Alistair.  “Into the Abyss: Deleuze.”  Edinburgh Encyclopedia of Continental Philosophy.  Ed. Simon Glendenning.  Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 1999.  615-627.

    • Wicks, Robert.  “Gilles Deleuze, Philosopher and Social Psychologist (`925-1990).”  Modern French Philosophy: from Existentialism to Postmodernism.  Oxford: Oneworld, 2003.  269-278.

    • Williams, James.  Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition: a Critical Introduction and Guide.  Edinburgh: U of Edinburgh P, 2004.
    • Žižek, Slavoj.  Organs Without Bodies: Deleuze and Consequences. London: Routledge, 2004.
    • Zourabichvili, François.  Deleuze: Une philosphie de l’événement.  Paris: PUF, 1994.








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Gonzo Corpus, Sayı V: Varoluşun O Karanlık Dehlizi “Ölüm”- Pdf.


1) Bütün Ölüler / Tibet Pinhan ~~

2) Yıkım Yazısı’ndan Fragmanlar / Maurice Blanchot ~~

3) Ölüm Üzerine Bir Tartışma Denemesi / Halil Duranay, Kamil Savaş & Mehmed Topuz ~~

4) Ölüm ve Müziğe Etkisi / Jeremy Utku Rıfat ~~

5) Ölümsüzlük Teorisi ve Gilles Deleuze: Bir Ölüm, İki Hayat / Cengiz Erdem ~~

6) İnsan Olmak Ölüyor / Arzu Reis ~~

7) Varolmanın Baştacı / Evrim Ulusan ~~

8) Allak Bullak Olmak İstiyorum ya da Peygamberin Makamını Sonlandırmak / Roger Gilbert-Lecomte

Gonzo Corpus, Sayı V: Varoluşun O Karanlık Dehlizi “Ölüm”- Pdf.

Spekülatif Realizm ve Transendental Materyalizm (1-4) Afrika Pazar

correlationist propaganda

Spekülatif Realizm ve Transendental Materyalizm -1-  AfrikaPazarSayi348

Spekülatif Realizm ve Transendental Materyalizm -2- AfrikaPazarSayi349

Spekülatif Realizm ve Transendental Materyalizm -3- AfrikaPazarSayi350

Spekülatif Realizm ve Transendental Materyalizm  -4- AfrikaPazarSayi351

Clayton Crockett on the Deleuze/Badiou debate–Philosophy in the 21st Century (via Objet petit a)

Introduction:  by Creston Davis

The greatest living French philosopher, Alain Badiou, passionately articulates one of the most striking claims made in philosophy today.[1] This claim is as simple as it is radical:  Truth happens in a material event that fundamentally and irrevocably breaks with the status quo (or any logic articulated in terms of pure un-breakable immanence).  Consequently along with this revolutionary “Event” Badiou opens up an entirely new horizon of being and possibility whose locus is found within the subject whose very identity is inextricably bound up in this Truth-Event.  Thus, with a new Event of truth there is necessarily a new subject devoted to that truth… Read More

via Objet petit a

Deterritorialization (via Larval Subjects.)

For many years I’ve been fascinated with Deleuze and Guattari‘s triad of deterritorialization, reterritorialization, and territory. Truth be told, when I first encountered these concepts I was repulsed. I found the language to be trendy and understood “deterritorialization” to refer to some romantic notion of “escape” from a territory. While there are indeed elements of this in Deleuze and Guattari’s thought, the concept, I believe, is much more … Read More

via Larval Subjects .

Cinema and Fetishism, or, The Commercial Value of Shit

Even shit has a commercial value, depending of course, on whose shit it is. While in the case of human shit you have to pay to get rid of it, in the case of animal shit it is said to be a very efficient and sufficient fertilizer for one who has learned to use it, rather than seeing it as something worthless because it cannot be eaten. “Inversely, it is this very terror that is projected on to the spectacle of the mother’s body, and invites the reading of an absence where anatomy sees a different conformation.”[1]

Since even the instincts are produced by the superpanoptic projection-introjection mechanism in which the subject finds himself/herself, giving free rein to the unconscious to express itself only produces projections of the evil within onto the without. For Freud the death drive is the effect of a striving for infinity, nothingness, and death. I would say it is also the cause of it.

Commodity fetishism is equal to will to nothingness in that it is the desire for the inorganic objects to stand in for nothingness, the Real of the subject’s desire. Capitalism replaces the use value of the objects with two-dimensional commercial value, so the subject desires to be desired, and he/she can only do that by adapting to the two dimensional sphere of commodity fetishism; by becoming a fetish object himself. If we recall Marcuse complaining that the one-dimensional is absorbing the two-dimensional  and also keep in mind that Marcuse’s two-dimensional culture has become the pre-dominant culture of today, we can see why the solution is to say, “I don’t see myself as you see me,” to the big Other in whatever form it appears in our lives.

In our opinion fetishism only occurs in sadism in a secondary and distorted sense. It is divested of its essential relation to disavowal and suspense and passes into the totally different context of negativity and negation, where it becomes an agent in the sadistic process of condensation.[2]

So the death drive produces new objects of desire by splitting the already existing objects. The subject as death drive, by splitting the symbolic, opens up spaces for the emergence of new objects of desire to stand in for nothingness and death.

The good object has moved to the side of knowledge and the cinema becomes a bad object (a dual displacement which makes it easy for ‘science’ to stand back). The cinema is ‘persecuted’, but this persistence is also a reparation (the knowing posture is both aggressive and depressive), reparation of a specific kind, peculiar to the semiologist: the restoration to the theoretical body of what has been taken from the institution, from the code which is being ‘studied.’[3]

Writing about cinema is essentially a criticism of the symbolic order, for both writing and cinematic production are themselves symbolic social activities. Since cinema exploits the life drive by satisfying the desire for something covering nothing, writing about cinema is essentially governed by the death drive which tries to expose the nothingness behind the symbolic. That which a film veils is nothing other than nothing; and exposing this nothingness behind the film introduces a split between the subject and the signifier. When looked at like that psychotherapy becomes critical of the existing social order, for by criticizing the film the critic heals the film industry hence having a healing effect on the spectator.

It is clear that fetishism, in the cinema as elsewhere, is closely linked to the good object. The function of the fetish is to restore the latter, threatened in its ‘goodness’ (in Melanie Klein’s sense) by the terrifying discovery of the lack. Thanks to the fetish, which covers the wound and itself becomes erotogenic, the object as a whole can become desirable again without excessive fear.[4]

According to Metz cinema is a fetish object. Films stand in for an object that is absent. The reflection of images on the screen veil the nothingness behind them without which they would not have been seen. “The fetish is the cinema in its physical state. A fetish is always material: insofar as one can make up for it by the power of the symbolic alone one is precisely no longer a fetishist.”[5]

Cinema produces unattainable objects of desire. By filling in a gap they render the nothingness more unattainable. They give the impression that there is something they are hiding and that way they produce the desire for nothingness. Cinema’s power of exploiting the will to nothingness, however, is the only tool one has at hand to criticize the cinematic apparatus as a form of ideology.

Sublimation of the objects of desire takes place through cinema and television. The more they are rendered unattainable the more sublime they become. What cinema does is to create the illusion of presence. Cinema shows an absent object through presenting an object to substitute for the nothingness. So it is the presence of an absence that we see on the screen. To enjoy cinema the subject has to know that what he/she is watching is only a presence covering an absence, that it is that which stands in for the Real of the subject’s desire. So Metz can say, “the fetish is the cinema in its physical sense.”[6] Looked at that way fetish is that which is produced to stand in for the Real object of desire, which is nothingness, and is therefore produced to satisfy the will to nothingness.

Cinematic narrative doesn’t show events in their real sequence. There are cuts, gaps, spaces between the scenes. All those, cuts, gaps, spaces between the scenes are openings to an external reality; they give the impression that there is something external to that which is actually being shown. The spectator is made to believe that there is something he/she doesn’t know as to what’s really going on in the film. This curiosity for that which is unknown inherent in every human is that which cinema exploits. By making the spectator simultaneously believe and not-believe what he/she is seeing on the screen, cinema creates an ambiguous relationship with itself and the spectator.

 By leaving gaps within the narrative, cinema invites projective identification. The spectator projects what he has inside him onto the absence within the filmic text. He fills those gaps with his internal partial objects and imposes a unity and continuity on the split narrative of the film.

The death drive involves splitting and introjection. The subject as death drive splits given unities and continuities. It is impossible for a spectator governed by the death drive to identify with the characters in the film. On the contrary, he desires nothing, identifies with nothing, without which he knows there can be no meaning. Rather than filling in the gaps within the narrative death drive puts them into the spotlight, it shows that those gaps are interior to the narrative itself. The incompleteness of the narrative is the condition of possibility for its meaning.

We can differentiate these two different types of spectatorship, one governed by the life drive and the other by the death drive, as associationism and dissociationsim.

In associationism the subject immerses himself/herself in the medium of the imaginary and identifies with the characters in the movie. In dissociationsim the subject introduces new splits between the internal and the external objects and hence renders identification impossible for himself/herself.

The life drive is the will to become one with the world, it is the force behind mimicry and associationsim. It is wrong to associate the death drive with mimicry and associationism. The subject as death drive dissociates and splits given unities and continuities. In horror movies the absence of the knowledge of truth for the spectator, that is, not being given the role of the omniscient eye, the spectator becomes curious and to understand what’s really going on in the movie he/she identifies with the characters. In the face of the abundance of gaps to be filled in the process of watching the film the life drive grows less and less strong for doing all the job throughout the watching process, while the death drive is oppressed and because of this very oppression it grows more and more strong. Eventually the life drive collapses and the death drive overflows the auditorium.

cropped-artwork_images_185199_333751_hiroshi-sugimoto.jpgAlthough it is itself a product of the death drive, horror film exploits the life drive, that is, the spectator’s will to form unities, bind the action, desire to get rid of all gaps and inconsistencies within the narrative. The death drive negates negation and reaches the highest possible degree of affirmation. Thanatos wills nothing, whereas Eros wills nothingness. We can see that the Thanatos case is the reverse of what Nietzsche says, “man would much rather will nothingness than not will.” Eros wants to want nothing; and strives to form such unities that everything will fit in its place; the system will lack nothing, so Eros will want nothing. Thanatos introduces splits, and tries to reach the nothingness behind the symbolic. Thanatos wants nothing rather than nothingness. He wants nothing to show the nothingness in the midst of everything, that there is nothing behind all that there is.

While Eros wants to lack nothing, wants the lack of lack, Thanatos affirms life as it is and wants lack, wants something to lack, wants that lack to remain after all is said and done, so that he can desire the nothingness which that lack presents. Thanatos doesn’t want something to replace nothing, but rather wants the lack in everything. By negating negation the death drive affirms life as it is, that is, in its incompleteness, and with nothingness and death in its midst.

[1]Christian Metz, The Imaginary Signifier: Psychoanalysis and Cinema, trans. Celia Britton, Annwyl Williams, Ben Brewster and Alfred Guzetti (London: Macmillan, 1982), 69

[2] Gilles Deleuze, Coldness and Cruelty, trans. Jean McNeil (New York: Zone, 1989), 32

[3] Metz, 80

[4] Metz, 75

[5] Metz, 75

[6] Metz, 75

Collapse Vol. III: Unknown Deleuze [+ Speculative Realism] Now available to download for free (via Speculative Heresy)

Word from Urbanomic that Volume III of Collapse has sold out and is now available for free online. It includes the much-cited original Speculative Realism conference. Find it here.

via Speculative Heresy

Collapse III contains explorations of the work of Gilles Deleuze by pioneering thinkers in the fields of philosophy, aesthetics, music and architecture. In addition, we publish in this volume two previously untranslated texts by Deleuze himself, along with a fascinating piece of vintage science fiction from one of his more obscure influences. Finally, as an annex to Collapse Volume II, we also include a full transcription of the conference on ‘Speculative Realism’ held in London in 2007.

The contributors to this volume aim to clarify, from a variety of perspectives, Deleuze’s contribution to philosophy: in what does his philosophical originality lie; what does he appropriate from other philosophers and how does he transform it? And how can the apparently disparate threads of his work to be ‘integrated’ – what is the precise nature of the constellation of the aesthetic, the conceptual and the political proposed by Gilles Deleuze, and what are the overarching problems in which the numerous philosophical concepts ‘signed Deleuze’ converge?


Editorial Introduction [PDF]
In Memoriam: Gilles Deleuze 1925-1995 [PDF]
Responses to a Series of Questions [PDF]
“I Feel I Am A Pure Metaphysician”: The Consequences of Deleuze’s Remark [PDF]
Subtraction and Contraction: Deleuze, Immanence and Matter and Memory [PDF]
Blackest Ever Black [PDF]
Mathesis, Science and Philosophy [PDF]
Malfatti's Decade [[PDF]
Chronos and Aion: Deleuze and the Stoic Theory of Time [PDF]
Matisse-Thought and the Strict Ordering of Fauvism [PDF]
Unknown Deleuze [PDF]
Another World [PDF]
Speculative Realism [PDF]

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