Deleuze, probably the most innovative philosopher of the event, situates the encounter with the event at the heart of his Difference and Repetition.
“Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not of recognition but of a fundamental encounter. What is encountered may be Socrates, a temple or a demon. It may be grasped in a range of affective tones: wonder, love, hatred, suffering. In whichever tone, its primary characteristic is that it can only be sensed. In this sense it is opposed to recognition. In recognition, the sensible is not at all that which can only be sensed, but that which bears directly upon the senses in an object which can be recalled, imagined or conceived. The sensible is referred to an object which may not only be experienced other than by sense, but may itself be attained by other faculties. It therefore presupposes the exercise of the senses and the exercise of the other faculties in a common sense. The object of encounter, on the other hand, really gives rise to sensibility with regard to a given sense.”
~ Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 139.
As for Kant, his whole project is to situate the traumatic incident at the heart of enlightened subjectivity itself. Isn’t Kant’s whole edifice an attempt at introducing a split between reason and the madness inherent to its constitution?Isn’t Kant’s whole edifice an attempt at introducing a split between reason and the madness inherent to its constitution?
“I have doubts whether there is a distinction between general lunacy (delirium generale) and that which is fixed upon a definite object (delirium circa objectum). Unreason (which is something positive and not just a lack of reason) is like reason, a mere form to which objects can be adapted; and both reason and unreason, therefore, concern themselves with the general. However, what first comes into the mind at the (usually sudden) outbreak of a crazy disposition (the accidentally encountered subject matter about which the person will rave later) will be from then on the insane person’s chief concern, since it is, because of the novelty of the impression, more firmly fixed in his mind than anything else occurring afterward.” ~ Isn’t Kant’s whole edifice an attempt at introducing a split between reason and the madness inherent to its constitution?”
~ Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, p.116.
And here is another relevant video…
The History of spirit is its own deed; for spirit is only what it does, and its deed is to make itself – in this case as spirit – the object of its own consciousness, and to comprehend itself in its interpretation of itself to itself.
—G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right
Shall we say that Hegel is the Father of Pragmatism? That we should know a self as what it does, rather than by its essence: what it is? And is the self processual, a disturbance of material agitation: a making that is a making of itself by itself, through the power of interacting on itself by way of techniques of language and interpretation of this self-making agency in process? Reza Negarestani situates this statement as outlining a “community of rational agents as a social model of the mind,” a functionalist model that is “essentially…
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